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A Re-Evaluation of the Application of 
Keynesian Economic Theory to Classical Athens 
 
By Kenneth Moore
 
 
A cornerstone of Keynesian economic theory is that the prosperity of the nation depends 
heavily on the amount that the state expends on the general welfare and on public works in 
particular. This paper will consider historiographical arguments around the application of 
this theory to Classical Athens of the 5th-4th c. BC. This example has been used to illustrate 
how, at times in which public outlays were high, the state also experienced significant 
prosperity, even reaching the apex of its power and dominance. And, conversely, when the 
amount of money expended by the state shrank and wealth was concentrated in fewer 
hands, it suffered diminished status. This amounts to a retrospective application of Keynesian 
economics that will, hopefully, illustrate a key fact of economic practice devoid, as far as 
possible, from the overarching ideologies that affect such theories in modernity. This is not 
an uncontroversial approach and the aim of this article is to examine previous attempts to 
apply this theory along with the criticisms of them. 
 
 
It is tempting to make recourse to modern economic theories in order to 
explain historical events in antiquity. This especially applies to instances, 
both in Classical Athens and ancient Rome, where vast government 
expenditures appear to have produced an economic "boom" affecting general 
prosperity in the short- and long-term. Keynesian economics in particular 
seem most appropriate to explain such phenomena. Keynes favoured increased 
state expenditures and lower taxation in order to stimulate demand (thus 
"demand-side economics"), and thereby employment, which were considered 
to have pulled the global economy out of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
1
 
Afterwards, the term "Keynesian economics" was used to refer to the concept 
that optimal economic performance could be achieved, with economic slumps 
thus avoided, by influencing "aggregate demand through activist stabilization" 
and economic interventionist policies undertaken by the government.
2
  
A number of theorists since Keynes have sought retrospectively to apply 
this theory, or some version of it, to ancient societies as illustrative examples of 
the process working in practice. Others have rejected that approach on a 
number of theoretical grounds. In particular, M. I. Finley and the "primitivists" 
(after Max Weber) have argued that no real comparison of this type can or 
should be drawn. The aim of this article is to examine some seminal instances 
of these and, through historiographical analysis, determine their relative merits 
or lack thereof. Due to limitations of space, the example of Periklean Athens 
and its immediate aftermath will be the primary subject of this inquiry; 
although, the case of Rome in the early Principate would also be applicable. 
Structurally, this article will examine the facts, as we understand them, of 
                                                          
 
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1. See J. P. Neary and J. E. Stiglitz, "Toward a Reconstruction of Keynesian Economics: 
Expectations and Constrained Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98. Supplement 
(1983): 199-228, for a fuller explanation of this theory. 
2. "Keynesian Economics," Investopedia, http://bit.ly/2zaY1Sr.  
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Athens’ economic prosperity under Perikles, move on to consider scholars 
who have sought to understand this in terms of modern economic theory and 
then engage with criticisms of such an approach. Have they formed a biased 
reception of Classical Athens through the distorting lens of modern theory? 
How have current events shaped such interpretations? Could there be 
something worthwhile and instructive in retrospectively applying these theories 
to the ancient past? 
Firstly, let us consider the "facts on the ground" as we have them. In 
454 BC, the Athenians transferred the treasury of the Delian League from 
Delos to Athens, ostensibly for reasons of security. The allies (soon to be 
the "subjects" of Athens) had mostly paid money into this treasury rather 
than provide ships, men and materiel for the common defence of Hellas 
against the Persians since Athens, at the head of a trading empire, was better 
positioned to produce them than her poorer relations. The 5
th
 century, Athenian 
historians Thucydides and Xenophon provide information on the income 
from the League.
3
 Thucydides, alluding to Athenian imperial ambitions, further 
describes this situation as follows: 
 
The Athenians also arranged for the other members of the League to 
pay their share of the expenses in money instead of in ships and men, 
and for this the subject city-states had themselves to blame, their wish 
to get out of rendering service which would cause most to have to leave 
their homes. Thus while Athens was increasing her navy with the funds 
they contributed, a revolt always found itself without enough resources 
or experienced leaders for war.
4
 
 
In addition to the obvious economic stimulus that this large-scale military 
expenditure entailed, the relationship between Athens and her "allies" allegedly 
required non-Athenian citizens to come to Athens directly for any legal 
proceedings arising between them and the Athenians. According to a 4
th
 
century satirical treatise known only as pseudo-Xenophon’s Old Oligarch: 
 
…they force the allies to sail to Athens for judicial proceedings…[b]ut 
they reason in response that the Athenian people benefit from this… 
[f]irstly, from these legal deposits they receive their dikastic pay 
throughout the year…the one per-cent tax in the Peiraeus brings in more 
for the city; secondly, if anyone has lodgings to rent, he does better, and 
so does anyone who lets out on hire a team of animals or a slave; further, 
the heralds of the assembly do better when the allies are in town.
5
  
 
                                                          
3. Xen. Anab. VII.1.27 notes 1,000 talents in total revenue, and Thuc. II.13.3 notes 
600 talents from imperial sources. 
4. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian Wars, I.99. See too Pseudo-Xenophon, 
the Old Oligarch, II.11-13, for further commentary on Athens’ trading empire as a source 
of material prosperity. 
5. Pseudo-Xenophon, the Old Oligarch, I.16-18; on the one per-cent tax, see Aristophanes, 
Wasps, 658. This was evidently some kind of customs duty. 
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Despite the provenance of the source, the facts revealed are illuminating. 
These judicial proceedings are, however, not unproblematic and their precise 
nature has been debated.
6
 It does seem clear that the court cases resulting 
from their League, alongside the augmented stipend for jurors by Perikles, 
amounted to a ready source of income for Athens’ citizens in addition to the 
allies’ regular contributions paid directly to the state, with positive, financial 
knock-on effects. This is above and beyond the increased revenues resulting 
from Athens’ position which, following a decree of the Assembly under 
Perikles, encouraged all Greeks to regularly send deputations to that city for 
diplomatic purposes, with the attendant costs borne by the foreign city-
states.
7
 
Indeed, the amount of cash flowing into Athens produced a sufficient 
surplus that some clever politicians, such as Perikles, opted to spend on 
infrastructure and ornamentation of the city and subsidies to ordinary citizens 
rather than just on the common defence. Thucydides was critical of these 
expenditures; but, we are told that Perikles put the matter before the Assembly 
and "they cried out with a loud voice and bade him take freely from the public 
funds for his outlays", and then proceeded to ostracise his chief critic, 
Thucydides, in 422.
8
 This, in turn, promoted wide-scale employment with 
the consequent increase in tax revenues for the polis. Perikles also reportedly 
shared the wealth of empire with Athenians and "won their favour by 
distributions of money and proposed allotments of conquered lands".
9
 
Thucydides was not alone in criticising Perikles’ fiscal policy. Plato too 
rejected it as his crowning glory, for philosophical reasons, saying, "as I am 
well aware, Perikles made the Athenians slothful, garrulous and grasping by 
initiating the system of public fees".
10
 That which does seem apparent from 
this though, whatever the moral objections of his detractors, is that Perikles’ 
policy of increased state spending corresponded with the height of Athens’ 
financial and political prosperity.  
Some further economic background is necessary here. Athens appears 
fairly unique amongst ancient poleis, and not only for being the first developed 
democracy. It comes across as surprisingly modern, in many respects, as an 
urban-based consumer society. As Hansen has effectively demonstrated, 
Athens was a "consumer city", if not purely in the ideal form as defined by 
Max Weber.
11
 As indicated, it was the hub of a trading empire, attested by 
Perikles famous "Funeral Oration" in Thucydides (II.38.2), although not a 
major exporter of goods, with one exception, insofar as we can tell. The 4
th
 
century orator Demosthenes was reported to have inherited an arms 
                                                          
6. For discussion of the controversial problem of the judicial relations of Athens and 
her allies, see G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "Notes on Jurisdiction in the Athenian Empire," Classical 
Quarterly, N.S. 11.1 (1961), 94 ff. The Athenians’ own account of their alleged litigiousness 
with regard to the allies may be found in a difficult passage of Thucydides at I.77 ff. 
7. Plutarch, Life of Perikles, XVII.1. 
8. Plutarch, Life of Perikles, XIV.2. 
9. Plutarch, Life of Perikles, XXXIV.1-2. 
10. Plato, Gorgias, 515e. 
11. M. H. Hansen, Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2010), 92-93. 
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manufactory from his father, and we hear of others too (discussed below), 
which suggests that at least one prominent export was weapons for warfare.
12
 
Citizens lived in both town and country, engaging in subsistence farming, 
albeit not enough to supply the population’s needs, along with considerable 
mercantile activities, especially sea-based trade through the port of the Piraeus. 
The hinterland of Attika was approximately 2,500 sq/km and this held a 
population in the Classical era of somewhere between 250,000 and 300,000 
people, with 90,000 to 100,000 living in the urban centre.
13
 Some of the people 
who resided in the city itself were farmers, going out to the countryside to 
work; some were landowners who rented out their properties either in the 
city or in the countryside. Many would have owned or worked for businesses of 
various types dealing with trade or with the production and maintenance of 
goods relating to trade and/or the military, especially concerning shipbuilding 
and shipping. There was a form of banking, loans made with interest for 
business ventures and an early form of insurance for merchants known as 
"bottomry" (or "catastrophe bond").
14
 
These and other qualities make Classical Athens a seemingly ideal 
subject on which to apply modern economic theory in retrospect—granted, 
with certain caveats and limitations. Indeed, it has been tempting for many 
to do so. The "New Deal" of U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt has 
invited parallels with the reforms of the 6
th
 century Athenian statesman 
Solon—both men used extraordinary political powers to push through 
economic acts designed to deal with apparently similar crises. And clearly 
there was something "in the air" in the late 19
th
 and early-/mid-20
th
 centuries 
that seemed to beg such comparisons. Prominent scholars of Greek history 
such as Eduard Meyer, Robert von Pöhlmann, and Ulrich von Wilamowitz-
Möllendorff have arguably gone to an extreme in the wholesale application 
of the terminology of modern capitalism to the economics of ancient Greece. In 
fact, the very title as well the arguments of von Pöhlmann’s treatise, The 
History of the Social Question and of Socialism in the Ancient World, evinces a 
tendency to interpret ancient conditions in terms of the complex and highly 
integrated system of capitalism contemporary with his lifetime.
15
 Other 
scholars have been quick to criticise this approach while some have continued 
to seek its refinement.  
There have been a number of objections to this parallelism and the 
origins of this tradition can be traced to "the Carl Bücher or primitivist" side 
of the so-called "oikos controversy" in the last decade of the 19
th
 century.
16
 
This approach stressed the "embeddedness" of ancient economic activity. 
Greek life was typically situated within small city-states, they argue, which 
were primarily agricultural in nature; whereas, the imperialistic expansion 
                                                          
12. Plutarch, Life of Demosthenes, IV. 
13. M. H. Hansen, Polis, passim. 
14. G. Corby, "Ancient Greek insurance scams", last modified February 5, 2009, 
http://bit.ly/2Blj1aP  
15. L. R. Lind, "Economic Man in Ancient Athens," The Classical Journal 35, no. 1 (Oct. 
1939): 29. 
16. M. Nafissi, "Class, Embeddedness, and the Modernity of Ancient Athens," 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 46, no 2 (Apr., 2004): 380. 
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we find in connection with capitalism elsewhere has been chiefly political in 
its motives. There was urbanization such as grew up in Hellenistic and 
Roman times as well as in Classical Athens; but, they argue that the Greek 
polis did not officially encourage a trade industry at the political level, and 
interfered with such activities only to maintain the food supply from abroad 
as necessary. The objectors maintained that the jealous separatism of regions 
tended to concentrate industry within individual city-states. There was no 
merchant marine, according to Lind in his 1939 work addressing these very 
issues, along with no reliable, universal currency for trade.
17
 Yet these and 
other such claims are not un-problematic, as shall be demonstrated. 
This alleged disconnect between political activity and the economy was 
seen in no small part as a philosophical one. Lind ranges through these points 
mentioned above, giving his final summation on the matter to the effect that 
that the main difference between ancient Greek economics and modern is: 
 
…the social and aesthetic attitude toward trade and industry. It will 
surprise the modern uninformed inquirer; it will shock that vast 
bourgeoisie who have been accustomed by more than a century of "big 
business" to look up with worshipful awe to the captain of industry, to 
learn that the Greeks despised businessmen. They were interested in 
humanity, art, letters, and the full expression of the personality; not in 
money and machines.
18
 
 
He supports this somewhat romanticised position with recourse to 
Plato’s Republic 371, alongside Aristotle’s Politics (i.11.5), as evidence for 
such an attitude. Certainly, the position of Plato’s speakers in the Laws is 
contrary to capitalistic expansion and opportunism as the modern world 
understands them.
19
 But one might well ask whether the views of elite 
philosophers actually reflected the zeitgeist of a whole civilisation. The 
interpretation of Athenian slavery, in particular, as a kind of "embedded" 
economic activity has in recent years been heavily criticised, largely dependent 
as it is on Aristotle.
20
 One of Lind’s other objections to this parallelism, namely 
that no Greek city-state was economically self-sufficient, seems counter-
intuitive since no modern nation-state may truly be said to be so. Indeed, he 
comes across as having an "axe to grind" which clearly exerts a particular 
inflection on his arguments. 
Like a number of opponents to drawing such parallels, Lind had essentially 
adopted a "primitivist" approach to ancient Greek economics which precludes 
comparison with more modern theories and systems. The strongest objections 
originated with social scientists and scholars whose conclusions were based 
in part on comparative models. The work of Moses Finley, beginning in the 
early 1950s, established this new orthodoxy, then codified with the term 
economic "primitivism". Grounded in the studies of Max Weber and other 
                                                          
17. Lind, "Economic Man in Ancient Athens": 29-30. 
18. Ibid.  
19. See K.R. Moore, Sex and the Second Best City (Routledge: New York: 2005), passim. 
20. Nafissi, "Class, Embeddedness", passim. 
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social theorists, Finley et al. asserted that, in terms of "operation and values", 
the ancient economy was an "embedded" phenomenon.
21
 It was, they said, 
fundamentally agrarian in character with ancient economic activity being 
directed by a complex array of social and political institutions and customs, 
with economic behaviour shaped by familial, religious and socio-political 
values.
22
 In re-evaluating their claims, Burke argues that there had been 
significant growth in actual economies, as well as in thinking about economics 
more generally, from the Archaic Age to the Classical; he admits that there 
"is disagreement, however, about what this evidence signifies".
23
 What is 
clear is that there was an emerging middle class during this period, with all 
of the standard economic activity that such implies, albeit limited by ancient 
technology and trade networks, and that the Athenian polis’ political power 
and dominance increased in proportion to its economic strength. 
In no small part, the rejection of contemporary economic models being 
applied to ancient Greece comes down to a matter of definition. During the 
post-colonial era following the Second World War, ancient historians had 
primarily regarded imperialism as an almost exclusively political and military 
activity in ancient Rome, Greece and elsewhere, with economic factors as 
secondary at best.
24
 This approach often ignored economic aspects of 
imperialism which figured prominently in the Delian League/Athenian Empire 
but which are seen in the globalised world of the early 21
st
 century as being 
highly relevant in connection to military and political power. Trade and 
commerce were integral to Athenian hegemony. Indeed, the issue of universal 
currency seems apparent, contrary to Lind’s objections mentioned above, since 
the standardised Athenian Owl drachmas, and later tetradrachmas, were 
developed specifically for trade, which implies a larger scale of economic 
activity.
25
 Xenophon bears witness to this, saying:  
 
Indeed, in most other cities it is necessary for traders to take in a return 
cargo, because the cities have coins that are not useful elsewhere. But in 
Athens, although there are many things to export which men will accept, if 
traders do not wish to take in a return cargo, they can also export silver, 
which is good merchandise. For wherever they sell it, everywhere they 
obtain more than its original cost.
26
  
 
                                                          
21. See e.g. M. I. Finley, "The Ancient City from Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber 
and Beyond," Comparative Studies in Society and History 19(1977): 305-327 and M. I. 
Finley, The Ancient Economy, 1973. 
22. E. M. Burke, "The Economy of Athens in the Classical Era: Some Adjustments to 
the Primitivist Model," Transactions of the American Philological Association, 122 (1974-
1992), 199. 
23. Ibid. 
24. S. Dimitriev, "The rise and quick fall of the theory of ancient economic imperialism," 
The Economic History Review, New Series 62, no 4 (Nov. 2009), 795. 
25. K. M. W. Shipton, "The Private Banks in Fourth-Century B. C. Athens: A 
Reappraisal," The Classical Quarterly 47, no 2 (1997), 403. 
26. Xenophon, Poroi 3.2. 
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Economic interests at the political level thus encouraged Athens to 
maintain a high demand for its coinage abroad. Such a policy echoes that of 
the modern United States.
27
 The extent of its political and economic power 
has made American currency a monetary standard throughout the world, 
potentially being a contributing cause of military conflicts with countries 
such as Iraq which had decided to stop trading oil in dollars prior to its invasion 
and "regime change" under President George Bush II in 2003. Athens was 
also concerned with maintaining the high quality of its monetary standard, as 
evidenced by Nikophon’s law setting up a special department to scrutinise 
the purity and consistency of the Owl coins.
28
 
Further evidence of the Athenian state’s interest in promoting its economic 
success was that the Athenian fleet certainly did provide security as a kind 
of merchant marine, albeit to an uncertain extent from what can be gleaned 
from the sources. As trade increased, the protection of merchant shipping 
and exertion of some type of policing of the sea lanes would enrich individual 
Athenians and, indirectly, have a positive impact on the state.
29
 Naturally, 
the state took an interest in the sea-trade. The Athenian fleet worked to 
suppress piracy in the Aegean; but, this was not its primary role, which 
remained military in nature. It is unclear to what degree this protective 
activity was organised and on what scale. The safety of traders was apparently 
considered less important than national reputation during Athens’ "second 
empire" era in the 4
th
 century when Hegesippus, an orator and statesman 
contemporary with Demosthenes, argued against a Macedonian proposal for 
a joint anti-pirate force on the grounds that to accept such a proposal would 
lower Athens’ status as a sea power.30 With the exception of Hegesippus’ 
speech, other orators’ references to actions against pirates are made only in 
passing.
31
 This does not, however, imply that they did not engage in merchant 
marine-type activities at all—quite the contrary, it indicates that they did. As 
with banking, below, we must not draw too many negative conclusions due 
to an argument from silence. Clearly they were using the navy to suppress 
pirates and thus to encourage trade. This illustrates the rising importance of 
consumerism and the state’s active interest in promoting it. 
Finley and his proponents also dismissed the extent to which commercial 
banking took place in ancient Athens. They argued that it was a "fringe" 
activity only, being undertaken by slaves and metics and, as such, not a central 
feature of the economy as one would expect it to be if modern parallels were 
to be drawn to any effect. But there were banks in ancient Athens and, at 
least according to some surviving forensic speeches, their role was firmly at 
                                                          
27. Darel Tai Engen, "ꞌAncient Greenbacksꞌ: Athenian Owls, the Law of Nikophon, and 
the Greek Economy," Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Franz Steiner Verlag, Bd. 54, H. 
4 (2005), 362-3. 
28. Qtd. in R.S. Stroud, "An Athenian Law on Silver Coinage," Hesperia 43 (1974), 157-
188. 
29. J. Ober, "Public Opinion and the Role of Sea Power in Athens, 404-322" in Naval 
History: the Sixth Symposium of the U.S. Naval Academy, ed. D. M. Masterson (Wilmington: 
Delaware, 1987), 28. 
30. Pseudo-Demosthenes 7.14 
31. E.g., Demosthenes 23.166ff., 58.53ff. 
Vol. 4, No. 1 Moore: A Re-Evaluation of the Application of Keynesian… 
 
14 
the heart of the economy.
32
 Historians have been encouraged to minimise the 
importance of the private banks due to Finley’s analysis in terms of Weber’s 
theory of the "consumer city", which absorbs agrarian products, depends on 
rents from land and returns little by way of production. This view has exerted a 
notable influence over Paul Millett’s analysis of banks in Lending and 
Borrowing in Ancient Athens. In that work he sees borrowing at interest 
from banks as a "last resort" of men who would prefer to "have recourse to 
eranoi (clubs) and other types of friendly loans."
33
 However, Shipton has 
demonstrated that Millett greatly underestimated the importance of private 
banks.
34
 She goes through speeches of the Attic orators to illustrate that the 
eleven extant examples "cannot be used as evidence for the actual rarity of 
such loans in ancient Greece".
35
 The allusions in the sources to customers 
who came to a 4
th
 century bank run by the ex-slave Pasion, who actually 
became a citizen due to his wealth and influence, demonstrate that banks 
recirculated wealth throughout the ancient Athenian economy and beyond. 
We are told that Pasion’s bank specifically made loans to people "for 
trade".
36
 There is no reason a priori to assume that this was an unusual 
occurrence. Pasion even used the profits from his bank at the Piraeus to 
develop a shield manufactory, thus linking finance directly to commerce.
37
 
Money entered the private banks from "foreigners, colonists, from citizens 
and metics, through trade profits, land, loans, and warfare"; it went out 
again to all of these and others.
38
 This exchange of wealth through the banks 
represents an ongoing cycle of deposits and loans. There was a structured, 
financial interchange between foreign and domestic investors from variegated 
strata of society. The cumulative impact of the private banks connected 
different areas of the ancient economy in a way that could hardly be described 
as "fringe" and which approached that of modern, multinational banking 
interests. 
The arguments of Finley and others have focused especially on 
comparisons between ancient and modern trade. However, Burke’s detailed 
analysis demonstrates that something like our contemporary understanding 
of economic activity along these lines did in fact take place which bears 
some striking similarities to Keynesian and other modern economic theories. 
As he argues, the onset of genuine commercialism had as a precondition a 
range of economic activities which "in no way was related to trade and 
                                                          
32. On what a bank amounted to, see Dem. 45.33. See too Dem. 36, 45; [Dem] 46, 49, 
50, 52, 53, 59 and Isok. 17. For approaches to this oratorical evidence see E. E. Cohen, 
"Commercial Lending by Athenian Banks: Cliometric Fallacies and Forensic Methodology," 
CPh 85 (1990), 177-90; S. C. Todd, "Use and Abuse of the Attic Orators," GR 37 (1990): 
159-78; P. C. Millett, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), and E. Harris, Aeschines and Athenian Politics in the Age of Philip 
of Macedon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), ch. 1.  
33. See Millett, Lending and Borrowing, 3, n. 8. 
34. Shipton, "The Private Banks", 397 et passim. 
35. Ibid., 402. 
36. Demosthenes 49.35. 
37. J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, 600–300 B.C (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1971), 428-30. 
38. Shipton, ″The Private Banks″, 421. 
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which was unique to the city in the second half of the fifth and first half of 
the fourth centuries".
39
 Central to that activity were the widespread and 
long-term cash subsidies provided by the state to its citizens, especially to 
those of the lowest social class, the thetes. This subsidy eventually, when 
combined with the impact of the devaluing of the chōra (non-urban hinterland) 
of Attica in consequence of Spartan tactics during the Peloponnesian Wars, 
fundamentally altered key aspects of the socio-political ethos of Athenian 
society. This eventually facilitated a transition to a greater commercialism. 
Poorer citizens received money in subsidy from the state and they spent it, 
thus affecting the economy in profound ways. Burke argues that, over time, 
this subsidy became a political "habit" which was indulged in even under 
harsher economic conditions; but, he asserts that it did result in "the onset of 
genuine commercialism in Athens…stimulated not by the laws of a 
disembedded, market economy".
40
 Rather, this "disembedding" of the Athenian 
economy was made possible through the erosion of a moral principle, based 
on traditional status, by experiences gained from addressing economic 
pressures. In that sense, it is not dissimilar from the American "New Deal" 
and the economic prosperity that resulted from it in the modern era.  
The work of Finley, Lind and others, consciously or otherwise, sought 
to distance ancient Athens from contemporary economic theory which others 
such as Meyer, von Pöhlmann and von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff had applied to 
it. The proponents of the primitivist/embedded model were in no small part 
reacting to these other attempts with recourse to a philosophical idealism 
that itself was somewhat dissociated from practical reality. The motivations 
behind the primitivist approach are difficult to pin down precisely; but, they 
may reflect political attitudes by elites in the 20
th
 century who engaged in a 
backlash against state intervention in economies—a backlash that had its 
roots in the so-called "free market", laissez faire ideology of the 19
th
 
century, itself a euphemistic façade for the unfettered accumulation of 
wealth by those already wealthy, usually with the tacit support of the state. 
It may be too that Finley et al wanted to remove the study of ancient Greece, 
which had traditionally been the preserve of elites, from what they perceived as 
the "ugliness" of modern economic theories. Possibly they sought to discredit 
Keynesian theory by refusing to admit that evidence from antiquity supported 
its basic tenets. 
It is perhaps more revealing is that scholars such as Lind and Finley, 
themselves elites within economically prosperous societies, sought to divorce 
economics from the intellectual and artistic achievements of Classical Athens 
with extensive recourse to other elites from that era. Plato was the son of a 
wealthy, aristocratic family who had greatly benefitted from his city’s 
prosperity. Aristotle’s father was court physician to the rulers of Macedon 
and his son also enjoyed the largess of Greece’s first city. Both of those 
ancient philosophers eschewed the conspicuous display of wealth while, 
simultaneously, being the products of that wealth. We cannot discount the 
                                                          
39. Burke, "The Economy of Athens in the Classical Era," 201. 
40. Burke, "The Economy of Athens in the Classical Era", 225. 
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role of such ephemera as chance and fortune, but these ancient philosophers 
arguably could not have achieved their successes in a poorer society.  
With these points in mind, it does seem clear that the ancient Athenian 
state was actively interested in its own economic prospects and intervened at 
the micro- and macroeconomic level to ensure them. It also seems clear that 
the Athenian Empire of the 5
th
/4
th
 centuries benefitted from this economic 
interest at state level and that not only did its citizens experience the positive 
influences of state subsidies, these in turn promoted further economic 
growth that coincided with that polis’ apex on the world stage as a hegemonic 
and economic superpower within the albeit limited confines of the 
Mediterranean world at that time. Historic causality is difficult to prove with 
regard to long-term trends and others will, no doubt, continue to debate 
these points. However, it does seem that Classical Athens repudiates both 
Keynes’ theories as well as the application of those and other modern, 
economic theories to the ancient past when our evidence makes it possible to 
do so. 
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